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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Juan C. Espinosa brought various federal and New Jersey state law
claims against his employer, Union County, alleging wrongful termination.  Espinosa
appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of Union County and the denial of his
Motion to Stay the Parties’ Pending Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Union County and its Board of Chosen Freeholders appeal a grant of summary judgment
in favor of Espinosa with respect to two cross-claims.  For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the District Court in all respects.
I.
A. Background
Because we write solely for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to
1Espinosa’s wife, Maureen Roig-Espinosa, is a co-plaintiff in this suit.  For the
sake of simplicity, however, we exclusively reference Mr. Espinosa as the plaintiff in our
opinion.
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our analysis.
Juan C. Espinosa1 was a corrections officer in the Union County Jail (“the Jail”). 
On June 18, 1995, Espinosa witnessed 25 to 30 fellow corrections officers beat, harass,
and abuse Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) detainees who arrived at the
Jail from the Esmor Federal Detention Facility.
In July 1995, after being approached by the Union County Prosecutor’s Office,
Espinosa agreed to assist in prosecuting those involved in the incident.  Specifically,
Espinosa helped prosecutors by wearing a recording device inside the Jail, obtaining
documents from the Jail, and permitting the recording of all phone calls to Espinosa’s
residence.  Espinosa also served as a witness for county prosecutors in front of grand
juries and at various officers’ trials.
In October 1995, after Espinosa had gathered evidence at the Jail and testified in
front of a grand jury, the Prosecutor’s Office acknowledged that it would be too
dangerous for Espinosa to continue to work inside the Jail because of a “long history of
intimidation and retaliation against corrections officers in the Union County Jail who
provide information with regard to the conduct of fellow corrections officers.”  App. at
A1541.  Accordingly, the Prosecutor’s Office permitted Espinosa to leave his job at the
Jail, and, in exchange for his continued assistance, promised him the following:  First, the
5County would continue to pay Espinosa his salary until the conclusion of the officers’
trials.  Second, the Prosecutor’s Office would assist him in securing employment in the
field of law enforcement in Florida by acting as a reference for Espinosa and contacting
senior officials there.  Finally, the County would pay Espinosa up to $15,000 to cover any
relocation expenses that he incurred in moving to Florida.  These promises were
memorialized in a letter sent by Acting Prosecutor Edward M. Neafsey to Espinosa’s
attorney on October 16, 1995.  Espinosa claims that additional oral promises regarding
continued employment with the County accompanied this letter.  The County and the
Prosecutor’s Office, however, dispute this claim.
After receiving the “Neafsey letter,” Espinosa continued to help prosecutors and
continued to be paid by the County.  He testified in front of another grand jury in
December 1995, reviewed transcripts, and testified at two criminal trials in January and
March 1998.  In May 1998, those convicted in connection with the incident at the Jail
were sentenced and the County Prosecutor’s Office no longer needed Espinosa’s
assistance.  
After the trials concluded, the County continued to pay Espinosa and provide him
with health benefits.  Espinosa remained in contact with County officials about various
personnel issues, searched for a job in law enforcement, and worked full time as a
security guard (for a company that began employing him in September 1996).  In July
1998, Espinosa met with County officials to review his personnel file.  In September
1998, Espinosa contacted Union County Manager Michael L. Lapolla to ask for a letter of
6recommendation, which Lapolla claims he sent.
On February 12, 1999, Espinosa accepted a job offer from the Atlanta Police
Department.  Two days later, on February 17, 1999, Espinosa’s attorney sent a letter to
Lapolla requesting a meeting, and on March 26, 1999, Espinosa and Lapolla met.  The
two men discussed potential job opportunities in Union County, issues surrounding
Espinosa’s pension, and Espinosa’s concerns about accepting a job in Atlanta that paid
less than he was currently receiving from Union County.  At no time during this meeting
did Lapolla guarantee Espinosa another position with the County.
At the time of the meeting, Lapolla knew Espinosa was still on the County’s
payroll.  After their meeting, Lapolla claims he called the County’s Director of
Administrative Services and inquired as to why Espinosa was still being paid.  Based on
his conversation with the director, Lapolla assumed that Espinosa would shortly be taken
off the County’s payroll.
In August 2000, Lapolla discovered that Espinosa had not been taken off the
payroll.  On August 2, 2000, the County sent Espinosa a letter asking him to return to his
position or resign.  On August 11, 2000, Espinosa sent a letter to the County stating that
he would neither report to the Jail nor resign.  On August 14, 2000, the County placed
Espinosa on leave without pay, continuing to provide Espinosa with health insurance.  
On January 8, 2001, pursuant to New Jersey’s Civil Service Act, Espinosa
2The County claims that it delayed commencing disciplinary action (from August
to January) in the hope that Espinosa would resign during this time. 
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received a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action from the County.2  In response to
this notice, Espinosa immediately sent a letter to the County requesting “a comparable
position outside of the County Corrections Department.”  App. at A1614.  Espinosa did
not receive a reply to this letter.  On January 19, 2001, the County held a disciplinary
hearing at which Espinosa, represented by an attorney, argued that he could not return to
the Jail out of concern for his own safety.  The hearing officer rendered an opinion on
March 27, 2001 and found that Espinosa had abandoned his job.  Accordingly, the
County terminated Espinosa from his position and stopped providing him health
insurance.
After the hearing, the County placed a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action in
Espinosa’s personnel file.  The notice indicated Espinosa had been terminated for the
following reasons: (1) failure to perform duties, (2) insubordination, (3) inability to
perform duties, (4) neglect of duties, (5) conduct unbecoming a public employee, and (6)
abandonment of position.  In actuality, Espinosa had only been terminated for
abandonment of his position.  Espinosa received a copy of this notice around the end of
March and immediately objected to the inclusion of the first five charges.  County
personnel promised to correct the form but did not do so until July 8, 2002, after repeated
requests from Espinosa.
B. Procedural History
3Espinosa also brought a variety of other claims, including a substantive due
process claim under § 1983, a claim for aiding and abetting a violation of the
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, and claims for constructive discharge, a state
constitutional tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The
District Court granted summary judgment to the County with respect to these other
claims and Espinosa does not raise any of them on appeal. 
4The County also brought a conversion claim against Espinosa. The District Court
granted Espinosa’s summary judgment motion as to this claim and the County does not
appeal its ruling.
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On August 2, 2001, Espinosa filed a twelve-count complaint in the United States
District Court against Union County, the Union County Prosecutor’s Office, the
Policemen’s Benevolent Association, and the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County
of Union.  The complaint included two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one for violation
of Espinosa’s procedural due process rights and one for retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment.  He also asserted a retaliation claim under the New Jersey Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) and the following state law claims: breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage.3  The County and its co-defendants
moved for summary judgment on all of Espinosa’s claims and the District Court granted
this motion.
The County and its co-defendants asserted counterclaims against Espinosa for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment.4 
Espinosa moved for summary judgment on these claims and the District Court granted his
motion.  
9Espinosa and the County and its co-defendants appeal the District Court’s grants of
summary judgment.  Espinosa also appeals the District Court’s denial of a motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) by which he sought to introduce additional
evidence of the culture of retaliation inside the Jail.  
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction of Espinosa’s claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The District Court had
subject matter jurisdiction over Espinosa’s state law claims pursuant to diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction to
review the District Courts’ grant of summary judgment and its decision to deny
Espinosa’s Rule 56(f) motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, “we apply the same test as the District Court should have applied initially.” 
Id.  That is, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(emphasis added).  In our review, we consider the facts and any inferences that follow
from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and we determine
“whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case by the
10
quality and quantity of the evidence required by the governing law or that he did not.” 
Anderson, 297 F.3d at 247 (internal quotation omitted).
“Summary judgment against a party who bears the burden of proof at trial . . . is
proper . . . [only if that party] fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.”  Anderson, 297 F.3d at 247 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)).  In this situation, “there can be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.”  Id.  (internal quotations omitted).
We review Espinosa’s challenge to the District Court’s denial of his Rule 56(f)
motion for abuse of discretion.  See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 500 n.12 (3d Cir.
2006) (citation omitted).  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court’s decision
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper
application of law to fact.”  Knight v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n., 457 F.3d 331, 337 (3d
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
III.
A. Retaliatory Discharge
Espinosa claims the County terminated him in retaliation for testifying against
fellow corrections officers in 1998 and for expressing his concerns about the Jail’s unsafe
working environment in 2000.  This retaliation, he asserts, violated his rights under the
5Because we can dispose of all of Espinosa’s claims for failure to show causation,
we need not decide whether Espinosa’s refusal to return to the Jail because of its unsafe
condition is expression protected under the First Amendment or CEPA.
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First Amendment and New Jersey’s CEPA.  Union County denies terminating Espinosa
for his expression and asserts that Espinosa was fired for abandoning his job.  Because
Espinosa did not produce sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between his
expression and his termination, we find he failed to establish an essential element of his
case.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment with
respect to Espinosa’s retaliation claims.5
1. First Amendment
Determining whether a public employee’s expressions are entitled to protection
under the First Amendment involves a three-part test derived from the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983),
and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1968).  McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have held that an
employee challenging retaliatory activity must show (1) his expression addressed a matter
of public concern, (2) his interest in the expression outweighed the state’s countervailing
interest as an employer, and (3) his expression was a “substantial or motivating factor” in
the alleged retaliatory action.  Id.  In addition, the Supreme Court, in a recent case, has
held that the public employee must also be speaking as a citizen and not pursuant to his
official duties.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1960, 164 L.Ed.2d 689
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(2006); see also Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining, in the
wake of Ceballos, “the issue is not only whether the speech in question addresses a
matter of public concern, but also whether it is made as a citizen”).  Generally, the first
and second parts of the test involve questions of law for the court and the third part of the
test involves a question of fact for the jury.  McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 364.  Despite this
general rule, summary judgment may be appropriate when a claim turns solely on the
causation part of the test because “only genuine questions of fact should be determined by
the jury.”  Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2005).
2. Conscientious Employee Protection Act
New Jersey’s CEPA forbids employers from retaliating against an employee who
does any of the following: 
b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of
law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the
employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business
relationship...; or 
c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or
practice which the employee reasonably believes:…(3) is
incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the
public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.
N.J.S.A. § 34:19-3. 
New Jersey courts have created a four-part test for evaluating CEPA claims that is
very similar to the three-part test for First Amendment retaliation claims.  Caver v. City of
Trenton, 420 F3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2005).  An employee seeking protection under CEPA
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must show (1) his employer was engaged in conduct that was either unlawful or in
violation of a clear mandate of public policy, (2) he performed a “whistle-blowing”
activity to alert others of the improper conduct, (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action, and (4) “a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the
adverse employment action.”  Id.  (citations omitted).
In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s CEPA claim can survive a summary judgment
motion, “the court must determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s proffered reason for the discharge was
pretextual and that retaliation for the whistleblowing was the real reason for the
discharge.”  Blackburn v. UPS, Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
           Employees can demonstrate a causal link between protected activity and adverse
employment action using circumstantial evidence.  For example, the temporal proximity
between the employee’s expression and the adverse employment action or a “pattern of
antagonism” on the part of the employer following the protected expression can raise the
inference of causation.  Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  However, “[t]hese are not the exclusive ways to show
causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the
inference.”  Id.  (citations omitted).
3. Analysis
Espinosa claims the County retaliated against him for his testimony against fellow
officers and for objecting to the unsafe working conditions in the Union County Jail.  To
14
support his claim, Espinosa points to retaliatory animus on the part of the County as
manifested by its decision to (1) terminate him, (2) include erroneous disciplinary charges
in his personnel file, and (3) file a counter-suit against him for the wages he collected
after May 1998.  He also points to the temporal proximity between his refusal to report to
the Jail and the County’s stopping of his pay as evidence of causation.
The County argues Espinosa was terminated solely because he did not come to
work.  In support of this argument, it first points to Espinosa’s own deposition, in which
he admits the County would not have fired him had he returned to his job: Q. But you
don’t think you would have been terminated if you returned to the Union County Jail? A.
No, I don’t.  App. at A1355.  The County also cites the “Neafsey letter” of October 1995,
in which prosecutors promised Espinosa that the County would continue paying his salary
only until the end of the officers’ trials.  Finally, the County argues that there is no
evidence of retaliatory animus, as the County continued to provide Espinosa with health
benefits until March 2000, and delayed holding Espinosa’s disciplinary hearing for nearly
five months in order to give him an opportunity to resign without prejudice. 
We find Espinosa failed to establish a causal link between his expressive conduct
and his termination.  First, Espinosa’s own words undermine his retaliation claim.  If
what Espinosa claims was true (and the County was seeking to retaliate against him for
testifying against fellow officers and objecting to the working conditions in the Jail), then
it follows that the County would have terminated him on August 14, 2000 even if he
would have returned to the Jail.  During his deposition, however, Espinosa admitted that
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he would not have been terminated had he returned to the Jail and started working on
August 14, 2000.  These two positions cannot be reconciled.  Second, Espinosa knew in
1995 that the County intended to take him off the payroll after the conclusion of the trials
because he was no longer performing any services for the County.  We do not see how
Espinosa can now claim the County’s following through on this intention was in
retaliation for his testimony.  Finally, Espinosa presented no evidence supporting his
claim that the County acted out of animus toward him.  After the trials ended, the County
provided Espinosa with a paycheck for 27 months (during which time he was collecting a
paycheck from another full-time job) and health insurance for 33 months.  Overall, given
the evidence presented by Espinosa, we do not believe a jury could reasonably find the
County terminated him in retaliation for his protected expression. 
B. Procedural Due Process Violation
Espinosa also claims the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the
County and its co-defendants on his procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Specifically, he argues his rights were violated when the County made a
variety of procedural missteps and stopped his pay without first holding a hearing.  The
County claims Espinosa received adequate due process and suffered no damages as a
result of any mistakes.  We find Espinosa’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were
not violated, as the August 2000 notice and January 2001 hearing satisfied the
requirements of due process.
When a plaintiff challenges the actions of a state on due process grounds, we are
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obligated to make two determinations: “whether the State has deprived the claimant of a
protected property interest,” and “whether the State’s procedures comport with due
process.”  Marshall v. Lauriault, 372 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lujan v. G &
G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195, 121 S.Ct. 1446, 149 L.Ed.2d 391 (2001)).  A
property interest in a public sector job arises when the employee has “a legitimate
entitlement to . . . continued employment” as determined by the laws of the state in which
he works.  Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bd. of Regents of
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)).  In
determining whether a State’s procedures comported with the requirements of the
Constitution, we balance (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,”
and (3) “the Government’s interest.”  Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931-32, 117 S.Ct.
1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct.
893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).
New Jersey law defines the procedural due process required before disciplinary
action is taken against an employee protected by the state’s Civil Service Act:  “the
employee shall be notified in writing and shall have the opportunity for a hearing before
the appointing authority or its designated representative.”  N.J.S.A. § 11A:2-13.  “The
hearing shall be held within 30 days of the notice of disciplinary action unless waived by
the employee.”   Id.  New Jersey’s Administrative Code further requires that, “[w]ithin 20
6Although Espinosa was entitled to the procedures outlined in the Civil Service
Act, his due process claim in this appeal is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.
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days of the hearing…the appointing authority shall make a decision on the charges and
furnish the employee either by personal service or certified mail with a Final Notice of
Disciplinary Action.”  N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.6(d).6
It is undisputed that Espinosa was a civil service employee who had a property
interest in his job.  Accordingly, we must determine whether the procedures ultimately
afforded Espinosa were constitutionally adequate. 
Espinosa first argues due process principles required the County to provide him
with a hearing before placing him on leave and terminating his pay on August 14, 2000. 
As the Supreme Court made clear in Gilbert, however, a temporary suspension without
pay generally does not require a predeprivation hearing.  Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932.  This is
because “lost income is relatively insubstantial” as compared to the “severity of depriving
someone of the means of his livelihood.”  Id.  Accordingly, we do not find that the
County’s removal of Espinosa from its payroll without a hearing violated due process.
Even if a predeprivation hearing was not required, Espinosa argues he should have
at least had a hearing promptly after the County stopped his pay on August 14, 2000. 
Instead, the County waited five months to hold a hearing (until January 2001) because it
claimed it wanted to give Espinosa a chance to resign without the prejudice of
disciplinary action. 
When an employee has property interest in his job, a suspension without pay is
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acceptable only if “the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt postsuspension
hearing.”  Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932.  In this case, however, we find the delay was
acceptable because Espinosa’s interest in his paycheck was weak.  In making this
determination, we consider the following:  (1) Espinosa had not performed any services
for the County in over two years; (2) he agreed that he would stop receiving a paycheck
and seek other work; and (3) he received over $100,000 from the County while working
at another job on a full-time basis.  Weighing Espinosa’s weak interest against the
County’s interest in removing a non-working employee from its payroll, we find Espinosa
had no basis on which he could claim he was entitled to additional payments from the
County.  As a result, we do not find the five month delay violated Espinosa’s procedural
due process rights. 
Espinosa also claims the delay between his disciplinary hearing and the issuance of
a decision in his case, which exceeded the time allowed by N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.6(d),
violated his rights.  We disagree.  Because he had not worked for the County for over two
years and had agreed to find another job, Espinosa’s interest in his continued status as a
County employee was weak.  For this reason, the procedural protections afforded
Espinosa by the County, which for the most part were consistent with the Civil Service
Act, were more than sufficient.
Finally, Espinosa claims that the inclusion for 16 months of erroneous information
on his Final Notice of Disciplinary Action constituted a procedural due process violation. 
Espinosa, however, fails to elaborate on this claim or explain how this error deprived him
7It appears that Espinosa originally brought this as a substantive due process claim.
Had we analyzed the claim as such, we would have reached the same conclusion because
he presents no evidence that his reputation was damaged by the inclusion of the erroneous
information in his personnel file.
8Because we review a motion for summary judgment decided against Espinosa, we
take as true his assertion that it would not have been safe for him to return to work.
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of a protected property interest.  Accordingly, we find this claim has no merit.7
C. Breach of Contract and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
As a County employee covered by the Civil Service Act and an agreement
between the County and the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, Union County
Corrections Officers Local No. 199, Inc. (“Union Agreement”), Espinosa could only be
terminated for “just cause.”  See N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.3; Union Agreement, App. at 1662
(“No employee shall be disciplined except for just cause.”).  He claims, however, the
County breached the Union Agreement and the Civil Service Act when it terminated him
for refusing to return to work in an environment the County knew was unsafe.8  He
further claims the County’s ordering him back to an unsafe environment constituted a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The District Court mistakenly interpreted Espinosa’s contract claim as identical to
his CEPA claim, and, as a result, granted summary judgment in favor of the County with
respect to this claim.  We find, however, that Espinosa’s CEPA and contract claims are
not identical.  His CEPA claim is based on his being fired in retaliation for his protected
20
expression.  In contrast, his contract claim is based on his being fired without “just
cause,” which does not require that he show retaliatory conduct on the part of the County. 
Although the District Court did not appropriately analyze Espinosa’s contract claim, we
ultimately uphold its ruling.
The County ultimately terminated Espinosa for abandoning his job.  New Jersey’s
Administrative Code describes job abandonment as follows: “Any employee who is
absent from duty for five or more consecutive business days without the approval of his
or her superior shall be considered to have abandoned his or her position and shall be
recorded as a resignation not in good standing.”  N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-6.2. 
The County agreed to continue to pay Espinosa his salary, even though he was
absent from work, from the time he began assisting prosecutors in October 1995 until the
conclusion of the officers’ trials in May 1998.  Accordingly, his absence from work
during this period could not have constituted job abandonment.  After May 1998,
however, Espinosa did not have permission to be absent and he failed to perform any
services for the County justifying compensation under his Union Agreement or the Civil
Service Act.  This was clearly job abandonment.  
In this appeal, Espinosa essentially argues there should be an exception to the plain
language of N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-6.2 permitting employees who are authorized to remain
absent from work for a finite period to remain absent and on the County’s payroll
indefinitely.  Were such an exception to exist, it would only be possible through the
approval of an employee’s superiors.  Since neither the County nor Espinosa’s superiors
21
authorized an indefinite period of absence from work with pay and Espinosa never found
another County job that would justify his being on the County’s payroll, we find the
County’s termination of Espinosa was based on just cause and, as a result, Espinosa’s
contract claim must fail. 
D. Fraud
Espinosa next contends the Prosecutor’s Office committed common law fraud by
promising him another position in the County in an effort to induce Espinosa to testify
against those involved in the INS detainee abuses.  We find Espinosa did not offer
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that such a promise existed.
“A misrepresentation amounting to actual legal fraud consists of a material
representation of a presently existing or past fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and
with the intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party to
his detriment.”  Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981)
(citations omitted).  Fraud claims succeed only when they are established by clear and
convincing evidence.  New Jersey Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Pavonia Rest., Inc., 725 A.2d
1133, 1139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
To establish fraud on the part of the Prosecutor’s Office, Espinosa must first show
prosecutors promised him a job.  By Espinosa’s own admission in January 1998,
however, no such promise was made: Q. Were you ever promised a job by anybody? A. I
have not been promised a job to this day. Q. Did the Prosecutor’s Office ever promise you
a job? A. No, they have not.  Excerpt of Trial Transcript in New Jersey v. James Rice, et
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al., App. at A1505.  In addition, the “Neafsey letter” sent to Espinosa after striking a
bargain with prosecutors is explicit about a lack of a firm job offer: “we are obviously
unable to guarantee [Espinosa] a position . . ..” App. at 1542.  Given Espinosa cannot
establish the existence of any promise on the part of the Prosecutor’s Office, his fraud
claim must fail. 
E. Tortious Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage
Espinosa also claims that the Prosecutor’s Office tortuously interfered with his
prospective economic advantage when it suggested to County officials a way by which to
terminate him.  We find Espinosa did not offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude he had any prospective economic advantage with which the Prosecutor’s Office
could interfere. 
To establish a claim for tortious interference with a prospective economic
advantage, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) the existence of a reasonable
expectation of economic advantage; (2) an intentional and malicious interference with
that expectation by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the interference and
the loss of the prospective gain; and (4) damage.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989).
Espinosa claims he had a reasonable expectation of continued payment by the
County with which the Prosecutor’s Office interfered.  We disagree.  Espinosa knew he
would not be kept on the County’s payroll in perpetuity:  Q. After your conversation with
Mr. Lapolla [in 1999,] did you understand that there was a certain timeframe to the next
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step in your obtaining a position within Union County? A. Well, I understood . . . I wasn’t
going to be home getting paid forever.  I understood that.  I mean, there’s a timeframe to
everything.  App. at A1329 (emphasis added).  In addition, he had not performed any
services for which he could expect to be paid for over two years.  Given these facts, we
find Espinosa did not present sufficient evidence showing a reasonable expectation of
continued payment by the County. 
 F. Rule 56(f) Motion
Espinosa finally claims the District Court abused its discretion by denying his
Motion to Stay the Parties’ Pending Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)), thereby prohibiting him from deposing two Union
County corrections officers.  These officers would have testified to the following:  (1) a
culture of retaliation existed inside the Jail; (2) the President of the corrections officers’
union had lied under oath about the conditions Espinosa would face inside the Jail should
he return; and (3) the County used payroll deductions from corrections officers’ pay to
support the families of corrections officers convicted of abusing the INS detainees.  We
find the District Court did not abuse its discretion.
Rule 56(f) permits the court to order a continuance of a motion for summary
judgment “should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). To succeed, a Rule 56(f) motion “must identify with
specificity what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude
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summary judgment; and why it has not previously been obtained.”  Lunderstadt v.
Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Espinosa fails to identify with specificity how the testimony of the two Union
County corrections officers would have precluded summary judgment.  The officers
would have provided evidence of the union’s indifference to Espinosa’s plight and the
dangerous prospects facing those who testify against fellow officers and return to work. 
Espinosa, however, had already introduced ample evidence of the union’s animus towards
him and the retaliation he would likely face if he returned to the Jail.  Such evidence is
cumulative.  In addition, we have taken as true his assertion that he could not return to
work.  Accordingly, we find the District Court acted well within its discretion when it
denied Espinosa’s Rule 56(f) motion. 
IV.
A. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In its counterclaim against Espinosa, the County seeks the return of over $150,000
in compensation provided to Espinosa between the conclusion of the officers’ trials in
May 1998 and Espinosa’s termination in August 2000.  The County claims Espinosa’s
retention of this compensation breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
associated with Espinosa’s October 1995 agreement with the Prosecutor’s Office.  We
conclude the County did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
Espinosa breached this covenant. 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “neither party shall do anything
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which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
the fruits of the contract.”  Wade v. Kessler Inst., 798 A.2d 1251, 1259 (N.J. 2002)
(citations and quotations omitted).  However, allegations of unfair dealing may only
advance upon the showing of improper motive.  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d
1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001).  That is, the case law “note[s] a state of mind or malice-like
element to breach of good faith and fair dealing, holding that the duty excludes activity
that is unfair, not decent or reasonable, nor dishonest.”  Id.  (citations and quotations
omitted).  “Without bad motive or intention, discretionary decisions that happen to result
in economic disadvantage to the other party are of no legal significance.”  Id. (citations
omitted).
The County contends Espinosa knew he was not entitled to payment of his salary
after the conclusion of the officers’ trials and he deceitfully accepted and retained them. 
The County further alleges that the issue of Espinosa’s motivation in keeping these
payments must be left to a jury.  The County is correct that a defendant’s motive is
generally a fact question reserved for a jury.  However, in order to survive a summary
judgment motion, a plaintiff burdened with proving malice on the part of another party to
a contract must at least proffer sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for that plaintiff.  Anderson, 297 F.3d at 247.
In this case, the County presented no evidence that Espinosa acted out of malice. 
Espinosa interacted with County officials on various occasions after the conclusion of the
trials, never concealing or lying about being on the payroll.  In July 1998, for example,
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Espinosa met with Union County officials about his personnel file.  In September 1998,
he contacted the County Manager for a letter of recommendation.  In February 1999, he
requested a meeting with the County Manager.  And, in March 1999, he met with the
County Manager.  In addition, the County Manager knew in March 1999 that Espinosa
was still on the payroll.  Based on these interactions, and a lack of any evidence showing
malice on the part of Espinosa, we must reject the County’s contract claim. 
B. Unjust Enrichment
The County also seeks return of the compensation paid to Espinosa after the trial
on a theory of unjust enrichment.  It argues Espinosa seeks to retain payments and
benefits, provided at the taxpayer’s expense, that he never should have received.  We
conclude the County did not offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
Espinosa was unjustly enriched.  
Unjust enrichment is the receipt of a benefit from another, the retention of which,
without payment, would be unjust.  VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526
(N.J. 1994) (citations omitted).  The unjust enrichment doctrine requires a “plaintiff [to]
show that it expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed or
conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant
beyond its contractual rights.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
The County presented no evidence supporting its expectation that it was to be
repaid by Espinosa.  The County Manager knew Espinosa was on the County's payroll in
March 1999, nearly one year after the conclusion of the trials.  At that point, however, the
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County Manager sought only to remove Espinosa from the payroll and not the return of
10 months of his salary.  The County Manager also admitted that he never asked Espinosa
to return his compensation.  Based on this lack of evidence, we find that the County’s
unjust enrichment claim must fail. 
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court in all respects.
